Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Company :
Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.; Attorney for Respondent.
Robert B. Sykes, Esq.; Phillip Kent Card Esq.; Sykes & Vilos, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Company, No. 890212.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2426

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT

"" v^v^un i

'

KFU

BRIEF

45.9
DOCKET NO.

Horn

I N THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF

i •<

PERCY MOUNTEER,
Appellant,
v

Supreme Court Case No. 89-0212

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

PRIORITY 14

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from Order of Dismissal by
Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and
Appeal from the Decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals in Mounteer
v. Utah Power & Light Company
773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989)

ROBERT B. SYKES, Esq. (3180)
PHILLIP KENT CARD, Esq. (5261)
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
311 South State Street, Suite 24 0
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801 533-0222
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
3 28 South State Street, #54 5
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

K)V 6

1990

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

PERCY MOUNTEER,
Appellant,
Supreme Court Case No. 89-0212

v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

PRIORITY 14

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from Order of Dismissal by
Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
and
Appeal from the Decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals in Mounteer
v. Utah Power & Light Company
773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989)

ROBERT B. SYKES, Esq. (3180)
PHILLIP KENT CARD, Esq. (52 61)
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801 533-0222
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
328 South State Street, #545
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS - REPLY BRIEF
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE RULES

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY

2

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I

3

THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, BY ITSELF, DOES NOT
BAR MOUNTEER'S
SUIT AGAINST HIS
EMPLOYER.
MOUNTEER DOES NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT UP&L DIRECTED
OR INTENDED HIM HARM IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SLANDER.
SLANDER IS NOT
ALWAYS AN INTENTIONAL TORT.
A. The Employment Relationship With UP&L
Does Not Bar Mounteer's Suit
B. Intentional Harm Not Required . . . .
POINT II

3
5
8

THE STATEMENTS OF LARSEN ON OCTOBER 6, 1986, WHILE
NEGLIGENT, DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER
THE ACT.
A. Curious Inconsistency
B. Confusion Between "Accidental" and
"Accident"
POINT III

8
9
10

MOUNTEER'S INJURIES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
PURELY PERSONAL INJURIES.
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO
REPUTATION EXISTS AND HAS BEEN ALLEGED. REPUATION
DAMAGE SHOULD BE ASSUMED IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ON
A SLANDER CASE.
A.
B.
C.

UP&L's Straw Man Approach
Complaint Raises Reputation Damage . .
The Focus of the Action

CONCLUSION

10
10
13
17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
UTAH CASES
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, (Utah
1986)

15

Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935
(Utah 1988)

13

Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453
(1955)
Bryan v. Utah Int'l. 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975)

7
12
5,
9

Freeaard v. First W. Nat'l Bank. 738 P.2d 614, (Utah
1987)

13

Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986)

13

Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988)

7

Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 107 U.A.R. 71,
773 P.2d 405 (May 2, 1989)

5,

OUT-OF-STATE CASES
Campbell v. Benson. 637 P.2d 578 (N.M. 1981)

11

In re Somers' Estate. 187 P.2d 433 (Cal. App. 1947) . .

11

RULES
Rules of the Industrial Commission. Rule 490-1-3(G) . .

17

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a)

15

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(h)

15

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(a)

2,
13

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(f)

2,

ii

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Larson, Workman's Compensation. Desk Edition. §68-13

.

5, 6

Larson, Workman's Compensation. Desk Edition. §68-23

.

6

Larson, Workman's Compensation. Desk Edition. §65,
(10/89)

4

Restatement of Torts, Second, §558(c)

6

Restatement of Torts, Second, §16

5

Restatement of Torts, Second, §21

5

Restatement of Torts, Second, §580B

6

iii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The

following

additional

issues

are

raised

by

appellee's brief:
1.

Is slander an intentional tort, such that the

employer must intend the harm in order to be vicariously liable?
2.

Can slanderous statements be negligent, and yet not

be deemed to be an "accident under the Act?"
3.

Has

Mounteer

reputation and other

raised

a

claim

"proprietary" damages, or

for

damage

to

is his claim

exclusively for personal injuries, as claimed by UP&L?

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Determinative rules which apply to this case are Rules
8(a) and

(f) , which appear under the title "General Rules of

Pleading,"

They are:

(a)
Claims for relief,
A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which
he deems himself entitled.
Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may
be demanded.
(f)
Construction of Pleadings.
All
pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY
UP&L claims that the employment relationship by itself
bars Mounteer's slander suit under the Workers1 Compensation Act
(the

"Act") .

However,

slander

is

not

the

type

of

injury

contemplated within the coverage formula of the Act, and thus is
not barred.

No decided case has ever held such.

Assuming that

slander is not within the coverage formula of the Act, Mounteer
is not compelled to prove that UP&L intended him harm in order to
establish UP&L's vicarious liability.

An employer's intent to

harm the injured employee is only required as an exception to
exclusivity in cases within the coverage formula of the Act and
where the tort involved is intentional.

Since slander is outside

the coverage formula of the Act, and is not an intentional tort,
Mounteer does not have to prove UP&L's intent to harm in order to
maintain his cause of action.
UP&L's claim that Mounteer admits that Larsen's acts
were intentional because Mounteer denies an "accident under the
Act," are misplaced.

There is no "accident under the Act"

because slander is not within the coverage formula of workers'
compensation.

The slander may still be "accidental" in the sense

of being negligent, and not be an accident under the Act for
policy reasons.
Although UP&L claims the contrary, Mounteer does state
a valid cause of action in slander for reputation and other
proprietary damages.

This conclusion is borne out not only by
2

the

words

in

the

complaint

per

se,

but

also

by

indulging

Mounteer with all reasonable inferences and facts that can be
proven, as the court must do in a motion to dismiss.

Mounteer1 s

slander claim is not "exclusively" for personal injury damages,
as UP&L claims.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, BY ITSELF, DOES
NOT BAR MOUNTEER1 S SUIT AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER.
MOUNTEER DOES NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT UP&L
DIRECTED OR INTENDED HIM HARM IN ORDER TO
ESTABLISH VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SLANDER.
SLANDER IS NOT ALWAYS AN INTENTIONAL TORT.
Utah Power & Light ("UP&L") claims: (1) the employment
relationship itself bars Mounteer's suit under all circumstances;
and

(2) to establish vicarious

liability, Mounteer must prove

that UP&L "directed or intended the injurious act or the injury."
UP&L Brief, p. 8.
A.

Both propositions are seriously flawed.

The Employment Relationship With UP&L Does Not Bar

Mounteerfs Suit.

UP&L f s claim that the employment relation, by

itself, bars Mounteerfs suit, has never been the law in Utah or
anywhere in the United States.
this

proposition.

("Brief"),

workers1

As

UP&L cites no case in support of

pointed

compensation

out

in

Mounteer ! s main

exclusivity

bars

suit

where there is "an accident," which produces an "injury."

brief
only
Unless

"... the injury falls within the coverage formula of the act,"
civil suit is not barred.

Larson, Workman's Compensation, Desk
3

Ed,. §65, p.12-1
case

from

the

(10/89) (hereinafter "Larson").1

beginning

No decided

of workers' compensation

until the

present, to the best of counsel's knowledge, has ever held that
slander is the type of injury which falls within the coverage
formula of the Act, even when it involves physical or mental
injury as a significant component.

See cases cited in Mounteer's

Brief, pp. 9-15.
Although the main issue is whether slander committed
within

the

scope

of

employment,2

falls within

the

coverage

formula of the Act, UP&L barely discusses the issue in its brief
(only 9 lines of argument on pp. 12-13).
this

issue

is tantamount

to

an

UP&L's side-stepping of

admission

that

Mounteer

is

correct, i.e., slander is not within the coverage formula of the
Act, and civil suit is not barred.3
1

"Larson" refers to the renowned worker's compensation
treatise. "Larsen" refers to the UP&L security guard assigned to
investigate Mounteer for possible drug use.
2

Although an issue was initially raised at the trial court
as to whether Larsen's words were uttered "within the scope of
employment," the Court of Appeals sustained Mounteer's arguments
in this regard, and UP&L lodged no cross appeal.
Should the
issue be raised, Mounteer incorporates in response Point I of his
brief to the Court of Appeals.
3

Mounteer cites six relevant cases spanning a 50 year
period in support of his bold statement that a slander action is
not
barred under workers' compensation, and that no reported
cases support UP&L on this proposition.
Yet, UP&Lfs brief is
silent on the issue.
Mounteer cites several passages from
Professor Larson's respected commentary Workmanf s Compensation to
the effect that an action for slander should not be barred by
exclusivity, even when it involves personal injuries. UP&L does
not challenge this treatise. To the best of counsel's knowledge,
the Utah Supreme Court has never disagreed with Professor Larson
on any significant point dealing with workers' compensation law.
4

B.

Intentional Harm Not Required.

UP&L argues that

even if the employment relationship itself does not preclude
suit, Mounteer is still barred because he cannot show that UP&L
directed or intended the harm or injurious act, citing in support
Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975).
misconstrues Bryan and

UP&L's brief

misstates the law because it fails to

distinguish between an "intentional injury" and an "intentional
tort."

Bryan stands for the proposition that an employer is not

vicariously liable for the intentional battery by its employee,
unless the employer intended the harm.
that

since

slander

is

allegedly

UP&L erroneously assumes
an

"intentional

tort,"

"intentional harm" must therefore be proved; and since no intent
to harm Mounteer is alleged, the complaint cannot legally stand.4
UP&L misapplies Bryan, based on its erroneous view of
the elements of slander.

Bryan is factually and legally much

different than Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 107 U.A.R. 71,
773 P. 2d 405 (May 2, 1989) because it dealt with assault and
battery, which by definition are intentional torts.
of Torts, Second, §21 (assault) and §16 (battery).

Restatement
Mounteer has

no quarrel with Bryanf s general statement of law, i.e. employer
intent to harm must be shown to establish vicarious liability
where the employee commits an intentional tort.
this an "almost unanimous rule."
4 (1989).

Larson terms

Larson, supra at §68.13, p. 13-

Bryan bases its holding on two sections of Larson,

4

UP&L's brief says: "In fact, Mounteer portrays UP&L as
purely passive to Larsen's intentional torts." UP&L Brief, p. 9.
5

both of which dealt with unquestionably intentional torts: §68.23
("torts directed or intended by employer") and §68.13 ("necessity
for actual intent to injure").

Bryan, supra at 895.

UP&L then

erroneously reasons that since slander is an "intentional" tort,
Larsen's harm is allegedly intentional.
intentional,

under

this

convoluted

If Larsen's harm is

view,

unless it intended to harm Mounteer.

UP&L

isn't

liable

However, if the slander is

not an intentional tort and/or Larsen did not intend to harm,
UP&L's logic falls apart.
The

first

intentional tort.
negligent.5

faulty

premise

is

that

slander

is an

It is not; slander may also be reckless or

The Restatement of Torts, Second, §580B provides:

One who publishes a false and defamatory
communication concerning a private person ...
is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and
that it defames the other, (b) acts in
reckless disregard of these matters, or (c)
acts negligently in failing to ascertain
them, (emphasis added).
See also Restatement of Torts, Second, §558(c).
The next faulty premise is that Larsen's acts were
intentional.

Without discovery, Mounteer has no way of knowing

whether Larsen's acts were "intentional" with respect to the
harm.

Certainly Larsen intended to speak; however, it is highly

doubtful

(but unknown)

that

she

5

actually

intended

to harm

This exposes a significant, unresolved question of fact
as to whether the slander was in fact intentional or merely
careless. This factual dispute only becomes relevant in a motion
to dismiss where, as here, the law does not support UP&L.
Therefore, factual issues must be resolved at trial.
6

Mounteer.

It is more likely that she negligently placed the call

on the loudspeaker unaware that the whole mine was listening.
Since all reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the
party opposing the motion to dismiss, the court should assume
that Larsen1 s statements were negligent.

If that is the case,

Bryan does not apply because it deals with an intentional tort;
therefore, Mounteer does not have the burden, as UP&L urges, to
show that the harm was intentional.
ordinary,

negligent

or

reckless

The case then becomes one of
slander; the

only

issue is

whether slander is within the compensation scheme of the Act.
On the other hand, if discovery establishes as true
UP&L's allegations that Larsen intended the slander, then to
establish

vicariously

liability

under

Bryan,

arguably prove that UP&L intended to harm him.6

Mounteer

must

Since there was

no discovery, UP&L's intent is unknown; it remains a question of
fact to be resolved through discovery and trial.
In 1987 at the hearing in the lower court, counsel had
no reason to know or suspect that UP&L may have intended any harm
to

Mounteer.

However,

since

that

time,

a

great

deal

of

information has come forth with respect to the investigation of
the Wilberg Mine disaster, together with a four week trial in
Provo in 1990 in which Mounteer was a witness against UP&Lfs

b

Mounteer takes the position that since slander is outside
the workers' compensation scheme, Bryan does not apply and intent
to injure is irrelevant in a civil suit.
If this view is
correct, UP&L's vicarious liability is determined not under Bryan
but under Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1988) and
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989)
7

position.

This leaves many unanswered questions about UP&L's

motives.

Those motives and unanswered questions need to be

probed under the light of cross-examination.
are suspicious.7
asks questions.

The circumstances

Mounteer does not make accusations, but only
Discovery needs to be pursued on these issues.

A motion to dismiss should not be granted where factual issues
remain which could support plaintiff's cause of action.

POINT II
THE STATEMENTS OF LARSEN ON OCTOBER 6, 1986,
WHILE NEGLIGENT, DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
"ACCIDENT" UNDER THE ACT.
A.

Curious Inconsistency.

Point II of UP&L's brief

argues that from its "point of view ... the ... Wilberg Mine fire
and Larsen1 s acts on October 6, 1986, and the injuries which
befell Mounteer were accidental."

UP&L Brief, p. 9.

UP&L then

claims that such "accidents" were designed to be treated as
industrial, thus proscribing a civil lawsuit.

UP&L Brief, p. 10.

This is grossly inconsistent with UP&L's position in Point I,
where, for the purpose of avoiding vicarious liability, it argues
that slander is "intentional."

In other words, when UP&L wants

7

Is it possible that UP&L wanted Mounteer discredited as a
witness for being on drugs? Was UP&L trying to avoid long-term
disability and/or workers1 compensation benefits for Electric
Mutual, UP&L's wholly-owned insurance company?
Did security
agent Larsen call the mine foreman to report Mounteerfs alleged
drug abuse over a mine loudspeaker, with several hundred people
listening, and then persist in the report after she was informed
that she was on a loudspeaker? If so, why? Why did she feel
compelled to make the report to the mine superintendent that day
rather than to her superiors within the UP&L security structure?
8

to avoid vicarious liability under Bryan, Larsen's statements are
intentional.
the

When UP&L is arguing that Larsen's acts fall under

workers1

compensation

scheme,

it

argues

that

they

are

"accidental."
B.

Confusion

Between

"Accidental"

and

"Accident."

UP&L misconstrues Mounteer's position by claiming that because
Mounteer denies an "accident," Larsen's acts were intentional.
Without discovery, Larsen's motives are simply unknown, but it is
also

legally

irrelevant.

Mounteer's

position,

entirely

consistent, is that Larsen's acts did not constitute an "accident
under the Act."

Mounteer Brief, p. 8-9.

In order for there to

be an "accident under the Act" for which exclusivity bars a civil
suit, there must be an injury of the nature and type contemplated
under the Act.
compensable

Mounteer's position is that slander is not a

injury

under

the

Act;

therefore,

there

is

no

"accident."
UP&L's

arguments

confuse

the

terms

"accident"

and

"accidental," insisting that if Larsen's acts were "accidental"
[i.e., negligent], they must also be an "accident."

Not true.

Slander is outside the workers' compensation scheme for policy
and historical reasons.

Therefore, Larsen's acts of October 6,

1986, could be quite "accidental" in the sense of being negligent
and

still

not be an

"accident" under the Act

reasons set forth in Point I, Mounteer's Brief.

9

for the policy

POINT III
MOUNTEER1S INJURIES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED
AS PURELY PERSONAL INJURIES,
SIGNIFICANT
DAMAGE TO REPUTATION EXISTS AND HAS BEEN
ALLEGED. REPUTATION DAMAGE SHOULD BE ASSUMED
IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ON A SLANDER CASE.
A.

UP&L's Straw Man Approach.

UP&L again employs a

Mounteerfs

straw man approach, mischaracterizing

position, and

then addressing its argument to that mischaracterized position.
UP&L

incorrectly

states that Mounteer

"describes

his

injuries

exclusively as injuries which are compensable under the ... Act."
(emphasis

added)

Mounteer f s

UP&L

complaint

Brief,

as

p.

claiming

11.

UP&L

only

characterizes

"personal

injuries

consisting of mental trauma, distress and emotional, disorders."
UP&L Brief, p.

12.

While

acknowledging

that Mounteer

sought

damages in paragraph 2 of the ad damnum clause for "damage to
reputation," UP&L urges that the claim be ignored on a pleading
technicality.
B.
the prayer

Complaint Raises Reputation Damage.

Paragraph 1 of

(See Appendix 1) does indeed ask for personal injury

damages of $500,000.

However, paragraph 2

asks for not less

than $3 00,000 "for general damages for embarrassment, suffering,
damage to reputation, and such other damages as may be proved at
trial."

Thus, non-personal injury damages are clearly sought in

the complaint.
allegation
injuries

that

which

It is therefore difficult to understand UP&L's
the
have

complaint
a

medical

10

is

"exclusively

identity,

for

physical

personal

and

mental

impact and are medically treated,"

(emphasis added)

UP&L Brief,

p. 13.
UP&L emphasizes that the words "damage to reputation"
do not appear
footnote

"a

in the body of the complaint, and states
mere

naked

prayer

unsupported

by

allegations" cannot cure a defective pleading.

in a

affirmative

In support of

this proposition, UP&L cites, but severely distorts the holding
of, two out-of-state cases. 8

Moreover, Mounteer's complaint is

hardly a "naked prayer unsupported by affirmative allegations."
The

allegations

detailed,

of slander

comprising

in the body

approximately

of the complaint

12

are

separately-numbered

paragraphs.

It is an inadvertent omission that Mounteer failed

to

damage

mention

to

reputation

by

name

in

the

general

allegations, but it is false to say that it was not discussed.
Paragraph 7 alludes to reputation when it says that the slander
was

"being broadcast on the public address system

5

... to the

In In re Somers1 Estate, 187 P.2d 433 (Cal. App. 1947), a
will contestant voluntarily dismissed her contest after the
defendant bank filed its answer.
The bank's answer raised no
affirmative defenses, asked no affirmative relief and did not ask
for a probate of the will; only the prayer requested that the
will be probated. This form of an answer violated a California
probate statute. In this context, the court held that the naked
affirmative allegation in the prayer was defective.
A much
different situation exists in Mounteer where affirmative relief
for slander was definitely stated in the body of the complaint.
In Campbell v. Benson, 637 P.2d 578 (N.M. 1981), a complaint
stated absolutely no cause of action against one of two
defendants, but the prayer asked for joint and several relief
against both defendants.
Since the plaintiff had not even
attempted to seek relief against this particular defendant, the
New Mexico court held in that context that a mere prayer for
relief under joint and several liability did not create a cause
of action. Neither of these cases is remotely similar to Mounteer.
11

effect

that

plaintiff

communicated

was

on

drugs,"

which

statements

"to many of defendants other employees,"

were

It was

alleged that "plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false
allegations
damage,"

in that

which

is

it caused him severe mental and emotional
exactly

what

damage

to

reputation

does.

Additionally, paragraph 18 indicates that the damages include,
"but are not limited to" post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish
and

depression.

Thus,

other

damages

(i.e.,

reputation)

are

clearly implied in the body of the complaint.
Even if plaintiff has technically erred by not having
the

words

"reputation

damage"

clearly

in

complaint, such error is not at all fatal.
pleading.

the

body

of

the

Utah has "notice"

Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. requires only that the plaintiff

state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," and "demand for judgment for the
relief

to

which

he

deems

himself

entitled."

There

is

no

requirement that every form of damage for slander be set forth in
the body of the complaint.
"entitled to relief."

Plaintiff need only show that he is

Rule 8(f) states that all pleadings "shall

be so construed as to do substantial justice."
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a complaint need
only give "fair notice" of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim

and

an

indication

of the

type of litigation.

This is

sufficient unless the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any stated facts which could be proved in support of the
claim.

Blackham

v.

Snelgrove,
12

3 Utah

2d

157, 280 P.2d

453

(1955).

Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when determining

the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint.
P. 2d

1352

Mounteer

(Utah
be

1986).

deemed

Liberal

to

have

pled

Gill v. Timm, 720

construction

requires

non-physical

that

"proprietary"

damage.
UP&L further misunderstands inferences on a motion to
dismiss.

The appellate court "... must construe the complaint

in the light most
reasonable

favorable to the plaintiff

inferences in plaintiff's favor."

Mounteer, supra at 733 P.2d
Zions

First

dismissal

Nat'l

Bank,

and

indulge all

(emphasis added)

at 406; see also Arrow Indus, v.

767

P.2d

935,

936

(Utah

1988).

A

is appropriate only where it appears to a certainty

11

. . . that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any

stated

facts

asserted."
Bank,

738

should

which

be proved

in support

of the

claims

Mounteer, Id. ; see also Freegard v. First W. Nat'l
P.2d

indulge

reputation

could

and

614, 616

(Utah

Mounteer

the

similar

1987).
inference

damages.

Certainly,
that

he

Furthermore,

this
is

court

claiming

regardless

of

whether Mounteer had pled such damage, such a "state of facts"
can

be

proved

in

support

several hundred people

of

his

claims,

particularly

since

from a small town heard the slanderous

allegations that day.
C.

The Focus of the Action.

UP&L's Point III, if

factually accurate, would make the most sense.
che

totality

personal

of

the

damage

comprised

Theoretically, if

otherwise

compensable

injuries, with no claim of "proprietary" damage, one
13

might ask why workers1 compensation could not sufficiently deal
with the problem.

UP&L's attempts to reshape the case in these

terms are, of course, illusory and exaggerated.

UP&L states:

Mounteer f s pleadings, his oral argument
before the trial court and the Utah Court of
Appeals,
and
his
pleadings
filed
in
connection with his clients [sic] to the
Industrial Commission of Utah, all describe
his
injuries
as
injuries
which
are
compensable
under
the
Utah
Workers1
Compensation Act. (emphasis added)
UP&L Brief, p. 14.

UP&L does not cite any relevant

"argument

before the trial court" in support of this statement, and with
good

reason.

defense

counsel

In

the

oral

himself

argument

acknowledged

before
notice

the

trial

court,

that Mounteer was

claiming reputation damage when he stated:
[Mr Proctor]
They've also alleged that he
has
suffered
not only
damage
to
his
reputation, and embarrassment and humiliation
the classic defamation damages but also as a
result of the incident, he suffered emotional
distress; and has at times, been hospitalized
and is at the present time, physically and
emotionally
incapable
of any
form
of
employment; he's totally
disabled
from
employment. That is the allegation and that
must be accepted as true. (emphasis added)
Oral Argument on Motion to Dismiss, July 30, 1987, p. 5, line 4.
(See relevant pages in Appendix 2.)
Later

in

response

to

questioning

by

the

judge,

Mounteer1s counsel summarized his damage claims as follows: "But
all I am saying is, that the primary thrust of our complaint is
non-physical damages.
p.22,

line

18.

Primary thrust."

Oral Argument, supra at

Later, Mounteer!s counsel reaffirmed that the

main gist of his complaint was damage to reputation:

[Mr. Sykes] But as far as a workers1 comp
issue, I think you look at the employment
relation and workers1 comp is designed to
cover an accident that causes injury; and I
cited the Allen case there.
Cited that
extensively and slander.
The real gist of
slander is not a physical injury, but damage
to reputation. (emphasis added)
Oral Argument, supra at 27-8.
UP&L likewise states that Mounteer focused on physical
injuries

in

the

oral

argument

before

the

Court

of Appeals.

However, there is no citation to the transcript, and counsel's
recollection is otherwise.
Lastly, UP&L claims that Mounteer1 s "pleadings11 with
the Industrial Commission describe injuries which are compensable
under the Act.

UP&L attaches 11 pages of documents in support of

this claim that are not a part of the record on appeal, and in
violation

of

Procedure.
these

Rule

11(a)

Mounteer

documents.

and

(h), Utah

strenuously

Normally,

objects

Mounteer

Rules
to

would

of

Appellate

consideration
not

address

of

such

matters because they are not relevant to the decision to be made
by this court.

Nevertheless, because of the possible prejudice

that might be engendered, these documents are addressed.
The

first document

Injury Investigation Report."

is a UP&L

in-house

It was filled out by an agent of

the employer a day after the slander.

It shows that the employer

treated the incident as an industrial occurrence.
see

how

the

employer's

view

"Occupational

of

serving, could prejudice Mounteer.

the

accident,

It is hard to
perhaps

The same could be said with

respect to the "Employer's First Report of Injury."
15

self-

Such forms

are filled out by non-law trained supervisors, who describe the
problem as best they can.

There is certainly no box on these

forms for "damage to reputation."

To expect the issue of slander

to be dealt with by on-site supervisors under these circumstances
is preposterous.

UP&L f s supervisory employees rightfully focused

on the physical and psychological results of such slander, which
were severe.

However, the fact that UP&L's own employees focused

on these physical and psychological consequences does not in the
least detract from the severe damage to Mounteer1s reputation,
which induced those physical problems.
"Supplemental

Report

months

the

after

Mounteer's
paranoid

of

incident),

problems were
personality

where

attaches

dated
the

"compounded

triggered

management personnel."
UP&L

Physician"

This is alluded to in the

by

April

7,

1987

(six

stated

that

resulting

from

physician

by

stress

remarks

made

him

by

representatives

of

(emphasis added)
three

letters

from

Energy Mutual, its wholly-owned industrial carrier.
these

letters stand

to

If anything,

for the proposition that Mounteer was not

treating this as an industrial claim because he allegedly refused
to send releases and other information Electric Mutual needed to
process the case as an industrial claim.
Finally, UP&L claims that the "Claim for Protection of
Rights" ("Claim") filed by counsel on June 8, 1989, constitutes
some sort of admission that this is really an industrial case.

A

simple review of the language of the Claim indicates otherwise.
Paragraph 6 recites that the notice is filed only for the purpose
16

of protecting Mounteerfs right to eventually file an industrial
claim if the Court of Appeals decision is sustained, because said
decision

held

accident.

that

the

incident was

a compensable

industrial

In the event the Court of Appeals decision was upheld

by the Utah Supreme Court, Mounteer would then file a claim for
workers1

compensation.

The Claim was filed as a precautionary

measure in accordance with Rule 490-1-3 (G) of the Rules of the
Industrial Commission

(Appendix 3) , which provides that such a

form may be filed by an applicant for the "purpose of protecting
his/her rights even though a dispute does not exist.11
UP&L
Mounteer*s

incorrect

focus

determination
discovery,

is

and

entirely

premature
personal

in

claiming

injuries.

and

only

any

assuming

damage

to

that

Mounteer

reputation

(which is highly unlikely).

or

was

other

that

Such

could only be made after a full opportunity

demonstrate
interest

is

a
for

unable

to

proprietary

At this point, however,

this Court should indulge Mounteer that he can prove proprietary
damage

under

broadcast

to

loudspeaker

the
a

at

undisputed

large
the

number

mine

facts
of

during

(i.e.,

small-town
working

the

slander

residents

hours).

was

over

a

Therefore,

granting the motion to dismiss was in error.

CONCLUSION
Mounteer has alleged

actionable conduct against UP&L

because the employer is vicariously liable for slander committed
within the scope of an employee's employment, whether or not the
17

slander

was

intentional

on

liability

the

or

theory

negligent.
that

its

UP&L

actions

cannot

escape

constituted

an

"accident" under the act, since slander is not an injury within
the compensation scheme of the act.
Mounteer presents a compensable civil claim because the
complaint

seeks

proprietary

money

for

read,

Mounteerfs

to

reputation

interests, as well as for personal

resulted from the slander.
broadly

damage

with

position,

other

injuries which

In this regard, the complaint must be

every
and

and

reasonable

construed

inference

to do

in

favor

substantial

of

justice.

When the complaint is so viewed, it states a cause of action,
even under UP&L f s theory in the case.
Lastly, any dismissal

at the present

time under any

theory of the case is premature, since certain facts upon which
a

dismissal

discovery.
reversed

must

be

Therefore,
and

the

based
the

case

cannot

be

trial

court's

remanded

for

determined
decision
further

m

should

be

proceedings,

discovery and trial.
DATED this 8th day of November, 1990.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

R6BERT? B. SYKES t
Attorney for Appellant
Percy Mounteer

18

without

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
depositing

hereby

certify

in the United

that

States

I

caused

Mail,

four

to

be

true

mailed,
and

by

correct

copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to the attorney
at the address listed below, on the 8th day of November, 1990.
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
328 South State Street, #545
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorney for Appellant/
835rb.o29
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ROBERT B. SYKES (Bar No. 3180)
M. GALE LEMMON (Bar No. 4363)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
TeleDhone: (801) 533-0222
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
,}

PERCY MOUNTEER,

-COM

)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

Civil No.^f 7-J 7 f /
(Judge

/

Defendant.

Plaintifff for cause of action, complains and alleges
against defendant as follows:
THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of

2.

Defendant is a public utility and a corporation

Utah.

licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Niki Larsen, at all times relevant hereto, was an

employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office
of the defendant as Chief of Security.

At all times relevant

herein, Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of
defendant UP&L.
4.

At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was an

employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"),

APPENDIX
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in its Mining Division.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was working

as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Mine, in Emery County.
6.

On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a

substantial, elevated state of stress, caused by the defendant,
for the following reasons:
(a)

In December, 19 84, at the time of the

well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at
the Wilburg Mine.
(b)

Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the

"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the minef
and the plaintiff should shut off the power.
(c)

The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the

power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive
of the belt boss.
(d)

As a result of the shutting off of power in

the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the
poisonous air out of the mine.
(e)

Plaintiff attempted to consult with various

management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power
turned off to the mine.

In addition, several months afner the

disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the
front gate of the mine.

In this position, he was required to

interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners.

2

(f) Because of the great strain caused by these
activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company.
(g)

On one occasionf he was told by Gene Shockey,

President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the company
to these people,
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal
life.
7.

While the plaintiff was in this agitated state,

defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs.
8.

The allegations were totally false.

9.

Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been

instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to
investigate the plaintiff for drug use.

UP&L had specific

procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of
drug use.
10.

Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false

allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional

3

damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric
hospital for treatment.
11.

Plaintiff has sustained, as a result of the

actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled
from employment.
12.

Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs

and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the
future.
13.

At the time of defendant's actions in this case,

plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year.

Since

the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is
not expected to work in the future.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
- Slander 14.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
15.

The statement made by the defendant's agent was

false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on
drugs when such was not the case.
16.

The publication of the defamatory statement by

Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in
any event.
17.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent.
18.

Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his

4

psychological, mental and emotional wellbeing, including but not
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and
depression.

In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently

damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally
disabled.

He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will

have substantial future costs.
19.

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because

of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the
conduct involved.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 20.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
21.

The actions of the defendant, by and through its

agent, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to
the plaintiff.
22.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 23.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above.
24.

In the alternative, and in the event that the

actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor
reckless, then the defendant's actions were negligent.
25.

Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,

5

and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.
26.

Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in

paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant
as follows:
1.

For judgment for slander, in the amount of

$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder.
2.

For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved

at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering,
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at
trial.
3.

For medical expenses in such an amount as

plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in
the future.
4.

In the event that any defense is raised in bad

faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees.
5.

For costs of court herein.

6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just

in the premises.
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987.

/ROfiURf £. SYKSS U / /
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
96 East 200 North
Huntington, UT 84528
835C
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IN THE D I STRICT
STRI
COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTOTCT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY + STATE OF UTA*?

—ooOOoo-1
2
3

PERCY MOUNTESR,
Plaintiff,

4
5
6

C 87

3791

—vs —
M O T I O N

7

TO

D I S M I S S

8
9
10

UTAH POr7ER AND LIGHT
CO.

Defendant.

\\
12

3E IT

RE::E:<:3ERED,

that on July 31st, 1037, the above-

13 Icaptioned cause of action came on regularly for hearing be for
14 the HONORABLE RICHARD H. x-lOFFAT, one of the Judges of tne abovfs
15 (named Court.
16

A P P E A R A N C E S

17
18 For the Plaintiff:
19
20
21 iFor the Defendant:
22

MR, R03ERT E. SYKES
MR. M. GALE LEMMON
Attorneys at Law
311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
MR. PAUL H. PRCCTOR
Attorney At Law
1J-07 West North Temole
Salt Lake City, Utah

23
24
25
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negligence in infliction of emotional distress and

2 we'll get to that.

In essence, they've alleged that Ms. Lars<|

3 committed an intentional wrong, which resulted in injury to
4 Mr. Mounteer.

They've also alleged that he has suffered not

5

only damage to his reputation,and embarassment and humiliatioj

6

the classic defamation ctoiages but also as a result of the

7

incident, he suffered emotional distress rand has at times,

8 been hospitalized and i s * the present time, physically and
9

emotionally incapable of any form of employment;he's totally

10 disabled from employment.

That is the allegation and that

U

There is also no allegation that

must be accepted as true.

12 Utah Power and Light Company, as a corporation or any of its1
13 officers/ or directors or managing agents, in any way,directsfci
14 Ms. Larsen to go to the Des-3e-Dove Mine site and defame Mr.
15 Mounteer or to intentionally inflict emotional distress upon
16 him.
17
18

There is no allegation the defamation or intentional

act was intended by Utah Power and Light Company, the employe
The Utah Supreme Court in

Bryan versus Utah Internat-

19

-ional, has answered that question with certainty;and that isj

20

absolutely not. Without active participation by the employer,

21

or through intent or direction,an employer is not liable to ajn

22

employee for the intentional tort of a fellow employee and

23

does not matter whether the intentional tort is defamation,

24

assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress or any

25

other tort classified as an iritertlicxx a3. one.

The employer

the scope of her authority.

I

And the second factor

2 that I think is not clear from the argument that has been
3 |given so far is, that we're alleging damages that are primari-)
4 -ly psychological in nature. Mr. Proctor kept referring to
5 [physical injuries. Well, there is an oblique reference in
6 (paragraph 18 of our Complaint in Paragraph 10, general alleg7

ations applicable to all of the causes of action.

8 " Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false

Says herel,
allegations!

9 in that it caused many severe mental and emotional damagesto
10 |the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric hospital
11

for treatment."

Then we say in Paragraph 11, that he sustain}

12 severe aggravation of post-traumatic distress disorder.
13

Nov/, if you take an expansive definition of psycholo-l

14 Igical and say that anything that is psychological is physical,|
15 pT guess that yeah, you could read it that way.

We're saying

16 mental, emotional, psychological. Obviously he had some
17 physical manifestations from that too.

If you have a headache),

18 you might get a stomach ache too. But all I am saying is,
19 that the primary thrust of our Complaint is non-physical
20 damages.

Primary thrust.

These are two important factors

21 fchat you have to bear in mind as I make my argument here briefly.
22 But addressing the Worker's Comp situation.

First I think that

23 (the first inquiry here is, what is the nature of the employment)
24 relation?

Clearly if Niki Larser. had come down at the request)

25 |of U.P. and L to the corner drugstore in Price, Utah and made

MR, SYK2S:

Ok.

That's within the scope of the

inve st igat ion.
THE COURT:

I don't think the scope of the investi]

-gation in that case would protect your client from jumpin'
out the window and killing himself.

The scope of the invest^

-igation was to see whether or not he was on drugs. She
opens the door and hollers at the guys passing by, Look,
there is a guy in here on drugs about ready to kill himself.
Come give me a hand.

That

within the scope of the investi-{

-gation2
MR. SYKES:

I would think so. Her job was to

investigate.
THE COURT:

I think you and I disagree on that onej

Go ahead.
MR. SYKZS:
that.

That's at issue here.

I clearly beliejve

Well, I think there is no allegation to my knowledge

here that she was not acting within the scope of her authori-J
-ty, he does say.
THE COURT:

No, I understand that, no. No.

He's

just questioning the sufficiency of your pleadings as they're)
set forth.

Allright?

MR. SYICSS:

But as far as the Worker's Comp issue,

I think you look at the employment relation and Worker's Comrj
is designed to cover an accident that causes injury;and Z
cited the Allen case there. Cited that extensive!^- and slancj

2/

1

The real gist of slander is not a physical injury]

2 hut damage to reputation.
3

THE COURT:

True.

4

MR. SYKES:

One of the main reasons why it's not

5 covered by the exclusivity bar of the Workmen's Compensation
6 Act, no accident because there was no physical exertion, no
7 impact, and no

unexpected or unintended occurrence.

The

8 Allen case said where you have a pre-existing impairment it
9 has to be an unusual exertion.

I don't think that you can

10 say that the man sitting at his desk doing his job and Niki
11 Larsen comes in and says, Are you on drugs? can be said to be
12 an unusual exertion to hin, because it's something that he is
13 supposed to do, Ok?

So I don't think, Your Honor, that there

14 is any basis for saying that they are a bar to Worker's Comp15 -ensationrand you'll note, that the only case I cited is one
16 of the few cases directly on point of that issue and holds
17 that that there is simply no bar for a slander action;not the
18 type of injury—the type of action that the Worker's Comp
19 Law is designed to bar.
20

I would just say, Your Honor, that the proper methojJ

21

I think in the examination of whether the employer is liable

22

for defamation of Niki Larsen is to ask first of all was she

23

operating within the scope of her authority at the time and ijn

24 not, then of course Mr. Mounteer can sue Niki Larsen.

If she

25 was operating under the scope of her authority, then clearly

28

R490. Industrial Conmission, Industrial Accidents,
R490-1. Workers 1 Compensation Rules - Procedures.
R490-1-1. Definitions.
A. "Commission11 - means the Industrial Commission of Utah.
B.
"Applicant/Plaintiff" - means an injured employee or his/her
dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or claiming benefits under the Workers'
Compensation and/or Occupational Disease and Disability Laws.
C. "Defendant" - means an employer, insurance carrier, self-insurer, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
D. "Administrative Law Judge" - means a person duly designated by the
Industrial Commission to hear and determine disputed or other cases under the
provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter 46b, U.C.A.
E. "Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance companies writing workers'
compensation and occupational disease and disability insurance, the Workers'
Compensation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted self-insuring privileges by
the Industrial Commission. In all cases involving no insurance coverage by the
employer, the term "Insurance Carrier" includes the employer.
F. "Medical Panel" - means a panel appointed by the Commission pursuant
to the standards set forth in Sections 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is
responsible to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of a compensation
claim, and may make any additional findings, perform any tests, or make any
inquiry as the Commission may require.
G.
"Award" means the finding or decision of the Commission or
Administrative Law Judge as to the amount of compensation or benefits due any
injured employee or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee.
R490-1-2. Authority.
This rule is being enacted under the authority of Sections 35-1-10 and
35-2-5, U.C.A.
R490-1-3. Official Forms.
A. "Employer's First Report of Injury - Form 122" - This form is used for
reporting accidents, injuries, or occupational diseases as per Section 35-1-97,
U.C.A.
This form must be filed within seven days of the occurrence of the
alleged industrial accident or the employer's first knowledge or notification of
the same. This form also serves as OSHA Form 101.
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease Form 123" - This form is used by all medical practitioners to report their
initial treatment of an injured employee.
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124" - This form is to be
filed with the insurance carrier or self-insurer after each 15 treatments
administered by the chiropractic physician.
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to Payment
of Benefits - Form 141" - This form is used for reporting the initial benefits
paid to an injured employee. This form must be filed with or mailed to the
Industrial Commission on the same date the first payment of compensation is
mailed to the employee. A copy of this form must accompany the first payment.
E.
"Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to
Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142" - This form is to be used by insurance
carriers or self-insured employers to notify an employee of the discontinuance
of weekly compensation benefits. The form must be mailed to the employee and
filed with the Commission five days before the date compensation stops for any
reason.
F.
"Application for Hearing - Form 001" - Used by an applicant for
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instituting an industrial claim against an insurance carrier, self-insured
employer, or uninsured employer.
This form, obtainable from the Industrial
Commission, must be filed and signed by the injured employee or his/her agent.
All blanks must be completed to the best knowledge, belief, or information of the
injured employee.
G.
"Claim for Protection of Rights - Form 002" - Used by an injured
employee for the sole purpose of protecting his/her rights even though a dispute
does not exist. Copies are forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE: THIS FORM
DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED.
H. Claim for Dependents' Benefits and/or Burial Benefits - Form 025" This form is used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee to seek benefits as
a result of a fatal accident occurring in the course of employment.
1. This form must be filed before a hearing or an award is made, and
pleadings will not be accepted in lieu thereof. If pleadings are submitted, the
attorney so filing will be supplied the form for filing before any proceedings
are initiated.
2.
The filing of this form by the surviving spouse on behalf of the
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse's dependent minor children is
sufficient for all dependents.
3. Unless otherwise directed by an Administrative Law Judge, the following
information shall be supplied before an Order or an Award is made:
(a) A certified copy of the marriage license and birth certificates of
dependent minor children.
If such evidence is not readily available, the
Commission will determine the adequacy of substitute evidence.
(b) Adoption papers or other decrees of courts of record establishing legal
responsibility for support of dependent children.
(c) If either the deceased employee or surviving spouse has been involved
in divorce proceedings, copies of decrees and orders of the court should be
supplied.
I. "Occupational Disease Claim of Employee - Form 026" - This form is used
by an employee claiming benefits under the Occupational Disease Disability Act.
J. "Occupational Disease Claim of Dependent - Form 027" - This form is
used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee who died as a result of an
occupational disease. All provisions of Section G above apply equally to this
form.
K.
"Insurance Company's and Self-Insurer's Final Report of Injury and
Statement of Total Losses - Form 130" - This form is used by insurance carriers
and self-insurers to report the total losses occurring in a claim for any
benefits. This form must be filed as soon as final settlement is made but in no
event more than 30 days from such settlement. This form shall be filed for all
losses including medical only, compensation, survivor benefits, or any
combination of all so as to provide complete loss information for each claim.
L.
"Dependents' Benefit Order - Form 151" - This form is used by the
Commission in all accidental death cases where no issue of liability for the
death or establishment of dependency is raised and only one household of
dependents is involved.
The carrier indicates acceptance of liability by
completing the top half of the form and filing it with the Commission.
M. "Medical Information Authorization - Form 046" - This form is used to
release the applicant's medical records to the Commission or the chairman of a
medical panel appointed by the Commission.
N. "Application to Change Doctors - Form 102" - This form must be used by
the employee pursuant to the provisions of Rule R490-2-8 as contained herein.
0. "Employee's Notification of Intent to Leave Locality or State, and to
Change Doctor or Hospital - Form 044" - As per Section 35-1-93, U.C.A., this form

